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CIVIL LAW AND THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION-
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
QUEBEC CASE
Ejan Mackaay and Claude Fabien*
Inflation is currently perceived in all Western economies as public
enemy number one. As recently as May 31, 1983, the leaders of the seven
largest industrialized economies, in their final communiqu6 following the
Williamsburg summit meeting, maintained the fight against inflation among
their top priorities.' The fight against inflation has led governments to
fix interest rates at unparalleled heights,2 causing Western economies to
slide into severe recessions from which they have only recently begun to
emerge. Unemployment has reached levels comparable to the 1930s.
In spite of all this, inflation has not yet abated, and unemployment
is still rising. Although all social classes appear to be affected, low in-
come families, the unemployed, and the elderly have undoubtedly been
the most seriously affected. Although these phenomena have not yet led
to the social dislocation that took place in the 1930's, our society, at the
cost of bad conscience, appears to be willing to live with the ills of
inflation.
Inflation may be defined as the continuous increase of the price level
in an economy, or as the corresponding steady decrease of the purchas-
ing power of a nation's currency in its national markets.3 This definition
does not mean that the prices of all goods necessarily increase nor that
the increases occur at the same pace for all goods. Quite conceivably,
the prices of some goods actually decrease during an inflationary period,
as has been the case for computers over the past decade.
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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as Le droit civil aux prises avec l'inflation, 28 McGILL L.J. 284 (1983). Research for the
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de Montreal as part of consumer protection law studies subsidized by the Formation des
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I. See Official Communique as published in the Le Devoir (Montreal) May 31, 1983,
at 10. The consumer price index, with 1971 as 100, has reached the level of 262.5 in 1982
in Canada. The average inflation rate over the 1973-1982 period has been 9.7%, with a
peak of 12.5% in 1981. See Appendix, infra p.754. For earlier years (1939-1970),
see Garon & Royer, Les effects de la dLprd&iation montaire sur les rapports juridiques
contractuels en droit commercial canadien et qudbecois, 50 CAN. B. REV. 389, 420 (1972).
Since the Autumn of 1982, inflation and interest rates both in the United States and in
Canada have been dropping steadily. In May 1983, the inflation rate in Canada, measured
over the preceding year, was 5.4%. Financial Post (Toronto) July 2, 1983, at Al.
2. See the declaration of the Canadian Minister of Finance on the 27th of October
1982. The Economy, 124 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS no. 396, at 20,077-81, 20,087
(Hansard 1982). See also the earlier declaration by Mr. Alan MacEachen, then Minister
of Finance, on the 28th of June 1982. The Budget, id. no. 370, at 18,876-77, 18,883.
3. K. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 3 (1982).
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The decline in the purchasing power of a currency is generally called
depreciation. This term is not to be confused with devaluation, which
is the decrease in the value of one currency in relation to another. Infla-
tion necessarily causes depreciation of currency, but it need not lead to
devaluation. Inflation may progress at the same rate in two countries,
with the comparative value of their currencies (the exchange rate) un-
changed, leading to depreciation without devaluation. By contrast, where
the inflation in one country is higher than in another, the currency of
the former will, in due course, be devalued in relation to that of the latter.
Economists are not at all agreed on the causes of inflation," and the
remedies they propose vary accordingly. Perhaps the only agreement among
economists is that inflation will to some degree persist in the foreseeable
future.' Some economists believe that Society can live very well with in-
flation, provided that it is foreseeable.' It is therefore useful to examine
both the effects of inflation and the solutions the law puts at the disposal
of economic actors to enable them to live with inflation.
THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION
To understand the law's reactions to inflation, it is necessary to be
aware of who stands to gain and who stands to lose in the inflation game.
The two groups may be identified by looking at the functions of money.
Three functions are generally recognized: (1) a means of payment; (2)
a yardstick for the assessment of value; and (3) a means of saving.'
When money functions as a means of payment, inflation affects
obligations to be performed long after they are contracted. The payment
agreed upon, which is initially equivalent to the corresponding perfor-
mance by the other party, is no longer equivalent when performance
actually takes place. As a result of inflation, the obligation in kind cor-
responds to a larger number of units of the depreciated currency at the
time of payment.' The problem is particularly obvious in obligations with
4. Id. at 7-10.
5. Id. at 12-15.
6. M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 276 (1979); H. LEPAGE, DEMAIN
LE CAPITALISME 404-05 (1978).
7. 3 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL-LEs BIENs no. 8, at 24 (9th ed. 1978).
8. In synallagmatic contracts, inflation produces this effect independently of the order
in which the obligations are performed. The following example will illustrate this proposi-
tion. X orders a machine to be built and delivered to him at time t. Between t and t +
1, the agreed date of payment, unanticipated inflation takes place. The equivalence of the
two performances is unquestionably no longer assured. Different results occur if the example
is changed so that payment precedes performance in kind. X now prepays at time t - I.
Between t - 1 and t, the time of the scheduled delivery, there is unanticipated inflation.
The manufacfurer must pay his workers and his suppliers in depreciated currency and hence
a nominally larger amount than planned. The equivalence of the two performances is no
more assured than under the initial assumption. However, under the second assumption
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a term and in duration contracts such as lease and hire, credit contracts,
building contracts and labor contracts. Similarly, inflation affects money
loans and life insurance: the insured pays a given sum and at a future
date receives a sum which is nominally equivalent but represents less pur-
chasing power as it is acquitted in depreciated money. Alimony and fixed
life-rents are also to be included in this category; their value declines in
real terms over time as a result of inflation.
The depreciation of money as a means of assessing value entails dif-
ficulties for the courts when they evaluate damages to be paid to an
accident victim. The evaluation of the damages and of their payment takes
place long after the initial mishap. Hence, it is appropriate for courts
to consider at what time the loss is to be assessed. Moreover, the courts
will have to estimate, in the case of serious injury, future losses which
the victim will suffer. Such evaluations must necessarily take inflation in-
to account.
Finally, inflation affects those who use money as a means of saving,
particularly those who live on the income provided by a fixed capital sum.
Inflation causes their means of subsistence to melt away.
THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO INFLATION
Several areas of the civil law are likely to be affected by inflation.
A variety of rules have been designed to cope with the problem, but further
adjustments in the civil law will be necessary to enable society to live
with the effects of inflation.
The Civil Code of Lower Canada (Quebec Civil Code)9 contains few
rules regarding inflation. The codifiers of 1866 undoubtedly took the view
that inflation was only a marginal phenomenon. The Code, like the French
Civil Code after which it is modelled, presumes that money is relatively
stable and is drafted as though a dollar today will always be a dollar
tomorrow. This principle, which provides that the "nominal identity of
money entails an irrebuttable presumption of identity of value,"" is called
monetary nominalism. Its main expression may be found in Quebec Civil
Code article 1779, which closely follows French Civil Code article 1895
and provides:
the manufacturer who has received payment as planned can invest it at market rates, which,
according to empirical studies, reflect foreseeable inflation. Yet the manufacturer is no worse
off under the first assumption. Since he knows the interest rates, which reflect anticipated
inflation, he can build this foreseeable inflation rate into the price he proposes to X.
9. The province 6f Quebec is in the process of adopting a new civil code. Book two
of the new Civil Code is already in force. To distinguish the two codes, the practice has
been adopted of designating the old code by its original name, Civil Code of Lower Canada,
and the new one by Civil Code of Quebec. The Civil Code of Lower Canada is hereinafter
referred to as the Quebec Civil Code.
10. 3 J. CARBONNIER, supra note 7, no. 6, at 20; K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 39.
19841
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The obligation which results from a loan in money is for the
numerical sum received.
If there be an increase or diminution in the value of the cur-
rency before the time of the payment, the borrower is obliged-
to return the numerical sum lent, and only that sum, in money
current at the time of payment.
Nominalism is a practical concept that allows agreements to be made
and judgments to be awarded for fixed sums which do not need to be
subsequently revised. Thus, the certainty or stability of legal relationships,
one of the fundamental values of law, is clearly favored. Admittedly, where
depreciation of money exists, this stability is acquired at the price of some
injustice. With moderate inflation, however, the social costs of trying to
avoid that injustice by continually adjusting fixed sums would be substan-
tially higher. The foregoing makes it obvious why, in spite of suggestions
to the contrary," no society has based its private law on the principle
which is the opposite of nominalism, namely valorism or realism.. This
principle provides that "the identity of money no longer holds where the
intrinsic value of the currency has been altered in law or in fact so that
the debtor would have to pay more of the depreciated units of money
to the creditor in order to offset the observed loss of value.' 2
Nominalism is not necessarily unfair to the creditor. To the extent
that the creditor has taken inflation into account in determining the amount
that he will ultimately be paid in depreciated money, he receives the precise
value agreed upon. In the case of a synallagmatic contract, the equivalence
of the two performances is thus assured in spite of inflation. In such
circumstances, a mandatory adjustment of the agreed sum in order to
take into account, after the fact, the inflation that has occurred since
the agreement would breach the equivalence and create a windfall gain
for the creditor as well as a windfall loss for the debtor. This result would
be unfair; the law should not be used for such disguised forms of
redistribution. Moreover, such correctives would tend to encourage peo-
ple to rely on public authority rather than on their own foresight to cope
with inflation. This contravenes the principle of autonomy underlying the
civil law, and might stimulate inflation.
The foregoing analysis may lead to the conclusion that inflation may
be left to market forces when two conditions are met: inflation must be
foreseeable, and parties must have the opportunity to take account of
11. Cossette, Les clauses d'indexation, 82 R. Du N. 455-70 (1979-1980); E. HIRSCHBERG,
THE NOMINALISTIC PRINCIPLE-A LEGAL APPROACH TO INFLATION, DEFLATION, DEVALUATION
AND REVALUATION (Israel 1971), reviewed by Perret, Livres et revues, 35 QUE. B. REv.
685 (1975); Baxter, Depreciation of Money, 52 CAN. B. REV. 577-87 (1974); K. ROSENN,
supra note 3, at 58.
12. 3 J. CARBONNIER, supra note 7, no. 6, at 20.
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inflation when they agree upon the sum of money to be paid at a later
date. One may wonder whether contracting parties are capable of an-
ticipating inflation, but empirical studies tend to show that inflation over
a given period is generally anticipated correctly in the interest rates of
the commercial banks in the preceding period.' 3 In these studies, the
nominal interest rate which banks charge is shown to consist of three
components: a net return on money lent (the real interest, remarkably
stable at between two and three percent), a risk factor (varying according
to the debtor's financial position and what he plans to do with the money),
and a factor representing the anticipated inflation. Inflation rates which
could not have been anticipated in this manner would be truly un-
foreseeable. Only empirical studies can reveal the frequency of such truly
unforeseeable inflation. Whatever the results of such studies, only in the
case of unforeseeable inflation would corrective intervention be
appropriate, and even then it is questionable whether the disease justifies
the cost of the cure.
One may object that the foregoing analysis of the problem only takes
account of general inflation. Where the prices of specific goods rise more
quickly than the general price level, the proposed method would be inap-
propriate. Yet would inflation be unforeseeable among those who deal
in the goods concerned? Empirical study will again be necessary to deter-
mine the frequency of such situations. Even without such evidence,
however, it may be fitting, particularly in the case of real estate, to con-
sider that people buy in part for speculative reasons, and that they should
bear the risk of unforeseen changes. If one sells his house for a given
sum, anticipating five percent inflation between the time of the contract
and the time of delivery, and bases the price on this increase, one would
have no ground for complaint if the prices of real estate turned out to
jump by twenty-five percent over that period.
If the inflation problem is to be left to market forces without resulting
in unfairness, not only must inflation be foreseeable, but parties to a con-
tract, particularly the creditor of the money obligation, must also have
the opportunity to take inflation into account when they determine the
sum to be paid. Only voluntary creditors can take inflation into account.
Involuntary creditors,' such as those who suffer damages as a result of
someone else's negligence, cannot negotiate inflation adjustments with their
debtors. Hence, legislative or judicial intervention should protect them
from the impact of inflation, foreseeable or not.
13. See, e.g., Rea, Inflation, Taxation and Damage Assessment, 58 CAN. B. REV. 280,
282-83 (1980); Paper from Samuel Rea, Jr. to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association
of Law Teachers, Inflation and the Common Law of Contracts 2 (May 31, 1982); K. ROSENN,
supra note 3, at 231; F. BALLENDUX, GELDLENING, INFLATIE EN GOEDE TROUW 208-26 (1981).
14. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 241, 244.
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Yet there are some classes of voluntary creditors who do not
themselves bear the risks of inflation. The Quebec legislature has limited
freedom of contract for certain classes of persons whom it deems par-
ticularly vulnerable, such as workers, tenants, and consumers. This pro-
tection is not granted because of inflation; the groups protected are thought
to be generally in an unequal bargaining relationship to those with whom
they conclude contracts. Under such circumstances, the general presump-
tion that voluntary agreement ensures fair exchange can no longer be main-
tained. This is true with respect to inflation as much as for other aspects
of contracts.
A proper analysis of the inflation problem can best be achieved by
dividing the civil law into sectors in which inflation causes similar prob-
lems and hence calls for similar solutions. The division should be based
on the three variables introduced earlier: the voluntary or involuntary
nature of the relationship between creditor and debtor, the foreseeability
of inflation, and the parties' bargaining power in relation to each other.
VOLUNTARY RELATIONSHIPS
Foreseeable Inflation
In the context of foreseeable inflation, the legislature may be expected
to refrain from all intervention, leaving it to the parties to protect
themselves against inflation. In practice, however, things are not so simple.
While parties who negotiate on equal terms are indeed left to protect
themselves, there is substantial legislative and other intervention in cases
of unequal relationships, where the weaker party is at the risk of being
exploited by the stronger one.
Equality of Bargaining Power
When parties have equal bargaining power, they need only the general
rules of contract law, which are based on the principles of freedom of
contract and nominalism, in order to cope with inflation. They may
stipulate anti-inflation clauses as they see fit.
The principle of freedom of contract may be distilled a contrario from
Quebec Civil Code article 13 which states: "No one can, by private agree-
ment, validly contravene the laws of public order and good morals. ' 5
One may deduce from this article that parties to a contract are free to
agree on any clause designed to shift the burden of inflation among them.
The articles of the Quebec Civil Code concerning this area constitute sub-
sidiary law (suppltifs) only.
One kind of clause has been prohibited since 1937 by an act of public
order: the gold clause or gold-value clause, by which a creditor seeks
15. See also M. TANCELIN, THtORIE Du DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS no. 14, at 17 (1975).
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to protect the value of his due by stipulating that payment will be made
in gold or will be a number of currency units equivalent to a certain
amount of gold at the date of payment.' 6 Some legal scholars have opined
that this prohibition, which is found in the legislation of several countries,'"
is essential to monetary stability and to public confidence in the curren-
cy. The argument does not appear to convince most economists, however.'"
Be that as it may, federal legislation in Canada regarding gold clauses
probably renders Quebec Civil Code article 1780-concerning loans in
bullion-inoperative. 9
Besides freedom of contract, the civil law is based on the principle
of the binding character of contracts (force obligatoire des contrats). This
principle is obvious in Quebec Civil Code article 1024,2° but it also
underlies the particular application of Quebec Civil Code article 1690,
which provides that an architect or builder who undertakes construction
work "upon a plan and specifications, at a fixed price . . . cannot claim
any additional sum upon the ground of a change from the plan and
specifications, or of an increase in the labor and materials," unless the
change has been authorized in writing. The principle of the binding force
of contract perhaps explains the hesitation of Quebec law to allow judicial
revision of contracts, even under the pressure of inflation.
Nominalism, another important principle of the law of contracts, is
expressed in Quebec Civil Code article 1779 which provides:
The obligation which results from a loan in money is for the
numerical sum received.
If there be an increase or diminution in the value of the cur-
rency before the time of the payment, the borrower is obliged
to return the numerical sum lent, and only that sum, in money
current at the time of payment.
Although the article appears in the chapter on loan for consumption
(mutuum), the rule it expresses is applicable to all payments.I'Article 1779
is considered to be subsidiary law2 and must be understood in the light
16. See The Gold Clauses Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. G-4, § 7 (1970); see also Tancelin,
L 'adaption des rapports juridiques de droit prive aux circonstances 6conomiques au Canada
et en particulier dans la province de Quebec, 12 CAHIERS DE D. 419, 431 (1971); Baudouin,
Les effets de la ddprdciation mondtaire sur les rapports juridiques contractuels en droit civil
qudb~cois, in XXIII TRAVAUX DE L'AssocATON HENIU CAPrrANT 391 (1971); Garon & Royer,
supra note 1, at 395.
17. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 135; 3 J. CARBONNIER, supra note 7, no. 8, at 27.
18. K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 137.
19. Garon & Royer, supra note 1, at 397.
20. Quebec Civil Code article 1024 provides: "The obligation of a contract extends
not only to what is expressed in it, but also to all the consequences which, by equity, usage
or law, are incident to the contract, according to its nature."
21. Baudouin, supra note 16, at 394.
22. 8 P. MIGNAULT, LE DROIT CIVIL CANADIEN 127 (1909).
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of the freedom of contract principle. The lender may stipulate that the
borrower reimburse not merely the numerical amount of the loan, but
the identical value to what the borrower has received.23 This is but one
of numerous contract clauses which parties may agree upon to counter
inflation.
Within the general framework of the principles of freedom of con-
tract and the binding force of contract, parties may organize their rela-
tionship as they see fit. Quebec practitioners have drafted an impressive
array of ingenious clauses to alter the effects of inflation for the contract-
ing parties. Without these clauses, inflation generally operates to the detri-
ment of the creditor of the money obligation, who sees the value of his
claim diminish over time. Anti-inflation clauses are meant to place the
burden of inflation on the debtor or to divide it between the debtor and
the creditor. While the list of anti-inflation clauses is limited only by the
imagination, some of the more common ones include interest clauses, value
clauses, revenue sharing clauses, indexing clauses, new value clauses, dura-
tion clauses and arbitration clauses.
The first mechanism a creditor will use to protect himself from infla-
tion in the case of loans and credit contracts is stipulation of a favorable
interest rate. Besides the net return and the risk component, the interest
rate should contain an adjustment for the expected inflation during the
contract. Empirical studies show that this practice is generally followed
in financial markets.2" With certain restrictions, particularly with respect
to the disclosure of the cost of credit, the creditor is free to stipulate
whatever interest rate his debtor will accept.2" The disclosure requirements
do not prevent the creditor from stipulating a premium or bonus clause
to be added to the agreed interest rate.26
The creditor may also protect his claim against inflation by substituting
for the national currency some other value unit less susceptible to infla-
tion, or by stipulating payment in the national currency of an amount
equivalent to a specific number of reference units. Thus, he may stipulate
payment in foreign currency or payment in the national currency of the
value of a specified number of foreign currency units, the equivalence
to be determined at the time of payment. Quebec judgments enforcing
such clauses will be expressed in Canadian currency. Of course, if the
exchange rate fluctuates, the time of conversion becomes critically
important.27 Finally, the creditor may choose to rely on commodities rather
23. Id.
24. See authorities cited supra note 13.
25. Garon & Royer, supra note 1, at 408.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 398-403.
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than foreign currency as the reference unit (a commodity clause)28 or may
stipulate a clause giving him a stock option in the debtor company.29
Even in the field of contracts, legislative intervention with respect to
inflation is not entirely absent. These interventions have, however, only
a subsidiary character. For instance, in the case of a lease-emphyteutic
or ordinary-the lessor, by virtue of Quebec Civil Code articles 524 and
1624,30 may keep improvements and additions made by the lessee by pay-
ing to the latter their value rather than their cost. The parties are faced
with a monetary obligation the amount of which is not initially fixed but
must be determined later according to the value of some good or service.
In principle, such an obligation is shielded from inflation and is often
referred to as a "debt of value." 3 '
The creditor may also have recourse to a revenue sharing clause. This
clause would be appropriate, for instance, for an hypothecary creditor
who intends to benefit from favorable business results of his debtor
(presumably against a lower base rate for the interest).3" This type of clause
also appears to find much favor with investors who set up shopping
centers: one attracts tenants by means of an initially low rent which in-
creases, however, with the profits, whether due to business success or mere-
ly to inflation. 3
Indexing or escalator clauses constitute another means by which the
28. Id. at 403.
29. Baudouin, supra note 16, at 395.
30. Quebec Civil Code article 582 provides:
As to improvements which the lessee has made voluntarily, without being bound
to do so, the lessor has the option of either keeping them, upon paying what
they cost or their acutal value, or permitting the lessee, if the latter can do so
with advantage to himself and without deteriorating the land, to remove them
at his own expense; otherwise, in each case, they belong, without indemnifica-
tion, to the lessor, who may, nevertheless, compel the lessee to remove them,
in conformity with the provisions of article 417.
Quebec Civil Code article 1624 provides:
The lessee may, on the expiry of the lease, remove improvements and additions
which he made to the thing.
If they cannot be removed without deteriorating the thing, the lessor is en-
titled to retain them, on paying their value, or to compel the lessee to remove them.
If it is not possible to restore the thing to its original condition, the lessor
keeps them without indemnity.
31. This expression is the translation of the German term Wertschuld, coined in 1925
by Arthur Nussbaum. See K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 222; 4 J. CARBONNIER, DROrr CIviL-
LES OBLIGATIONS no. 5, at 22 (7th ed. 1972). Carbonnier considers the debt of value to
be an obligation in kind (obligation en nature). For Quebec law, see M. TANCELIN, supra
note 15, nos. 539-40, at 354-55.
32. Martel, Le placement hybride, 71 R. DU N. 223 (1969).
33. Tancelin, supra note 16, at 429.
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creditor can transfer all or part of the inflation burden onto the debtor.
Quebec law fully recognizes the validity of such clauses."' Generally, they
provide that the nominal amount of the debt will be adjusted according
to some index figure, such as the consumer price index established by
Statistics Canada. Such clauses are frequent in collective labor
agreements." Several authors have proposed that this technique of
revalorization of debts be applied to large classes of contracts.36 This solu-
tion, which has not yet been adopted, is open to criticism. Revalorization
may seem fair when parties have not anticipated inflation. It creates in-
justice, however, where parties have taken the effects of inflation into
account-as they should under the principle of freedom of contract-
explicitly by agreeing on an indexing clause or implicitly by stipulating
more onerous financial obligations than would be justified in the absence
of inflation.
In the insurance field, inflation has led to a new practice involving
the use of new-value clauses. In the case of loss or theft of property,
the insured is entitled to a sum allowing him to buy corresponding new
goods in replacement. Among other virtues, such a clause is, of course,
a perfect hedge against inflation. It is not without dangers, however. By
replacing old goods with new, such a clause entitles the insured to more
than the real value of the insured property and thereby creates what
economists call "moral hazard," i.e., an incentive for the insured to take
less than optimal precautions against the insured risk. Moral hazard tends
to drive up the insurance premium and may ultimately make this kind
of insurance impossible.37
An altogether different strategy to cope with the uncertainty resulting
from inflation is to limit the duration of contracts and to renegotiate,
taking into account the changed circumstances. Obviously, this way of
absorbing inflation increases transaction costs, both in the form of
negotiating costs and by way of increased chances of friction among the
parties. Undoubtedly, however, this strategy is widely adopted in prac-
tice. One of the most visible consequences of inflation is a general
reduction in the duration of long-term contracts." In hypothec contracts,
for instance, the normal term used to be twenty-five years. A few years
34. Garon & Royer, supra note 1, at 405, 410; Commonwealth Savings Plan Ltd. v.
Triangle "C" Cattle Co., 56 D.L.R.2d 453 (Can. 1966); Cossette, supra note 11; M. TANCELIN,
supra note 15, nos. 545-46, at 358-59.
35. Gagnon, La dpreciation de l'argent: Solutions en droit canadien du travail, 27
INDUS. REL. 769, 769-75 (1972); CENTRE DE RECHERCHE ET DE STATISTIQUES SUR LE MARCHc
DU TRAVAIL, LES CLAUSES D'INDEXATION (1981).
36. See authorities cited supra note 11.
37. One writer has suggested that a trend in this direction may have already begun.
See Hamel, La'valeur t neuf" contribue 6 la hausse des incendies criminels, Le Devoir (Mon-
treal) Oct. 28, 1982, at 20.
38. Gagnon, supra note 35, at 770-72.
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ago, clauses started to appear providing for the renegotiation of the in-
terest rate after five years. At present, hypothec contracts of two or three
years, and even contracts for a single year or less, are not uncommon.
The duvation of leases has also diminished radically; residential leases for
more than one year are rare. Additionally, collective labor agreements
frequently are concluded for one year only and those that exceed a year
provide for the "reopening" of the salary clauses if inflation reaches an
agreed threshold. The field of labor relations poignantly illustrates the
disadvantages of short-term contracts: the opportunities for friction and
strikes multiply.39
A final way of combatting inflation is arbitration, a method unjustly
ignored. Where inflation appears to be a problem and parties are unable
to agree on how much allowance should be made for it in the contract,
they may agree in advance to have recourse to outside arbitration if in-
flation exceeds a certain threshold. A contract which involves new materials
on the world market is a good example of where this method would be
practical. The arbitrator will ensure that the contract terms are changed
so as to constitute a fair exchange.
When an obligation is not voluntarily performed, inflation has a
definite effect during the time which elapses between the initially scheduled
date of performance and the time when the creditor actually receives per-
formance or damages. It will be helpful to distinguish between delayed
performance, on the one hand, and total or partial inexecution (including
defective performance) on the other. Included in this latter category are
the cases where performance, although still possible and offered by the
debtor, no longer presents an interest to the creditor because of the delay.
Inflation occurring during the period when performance is delayed
does not affect obligations in kind and monetary obligations in the same
manner. The creditor of an obligation in kind the performance of which
has been delayed-whether it ultimately takes place by court order or
through voluntary action of the debtor-receives the value to which he
was entitled. Inflation has not eroded this value. Of course, the value
of' the good or service may have evolved differently from inflation in
general during the delay, but the situation would not have been different
with regular performance. The creditor, therefore, has little reason for
complaint. Conceivably, the creditor may suffer damage from the mere
fact of being deprived of the performance for a period of time, but he
has the burden to prove such damage. Inflation enters the picture only
when it becomes necessary to decide when to assess this damage and who
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From the foregoing it follows that the risk of inflation is borne by
the debtor of the obligation in kind whose performance is delayed. The
costs of performance and its value go up, while the price he receives in
return is fixed. This result seems fair. By putting the burden of inflation
on the party who controls the date of actual performance, the law creates
an incentive for parties to perform on time-pacta sunt servanda. The
force of this principle is somewhat undercut in the case of synallagmatic
contracts where the creditor of the obligation in kind has already paid
his part while his debtor delays performance. In this case, the debtor in
default can make at least commercial interest rates on the prepaid sum
and is hence protected from inflation. The law does not distinguish, in
damage awards, between creditors who prepaid and those who have agreed
to pay upon performance. Hence, prudence commands in inflationary times
that one not prepay for goods to be delivered or services to be provided
later.
For monetary or pecuniary obligations, the analysis is quite different.
The value which the creditor stands ultimately to receive is reduced exactly
at the rate of inflation over the period during which the debtor stalls.
Parties may, in anticipation of this problem, change the effects of nonper-
formance through a penalty clause ° or a compound interest clause, by
virtue of which the interest due bears interest itself.4" In this view the
legislature has only a limited role to play, i.e., to establish, as subsidiary
law, the legal interest rate on overdue payments at a level that corresponds
to what parties would presumably have stipulated themselves.' Since
freedom of contract reigns supreme here, increased inflation, although
widening the gap between legal and commercial interest rates, provides
no ground for a change of the law.
40. Que. Civ. Code arts. 1131-1137. The first paragraph of Quebec Civil Code article
1135 is of particular interest and provides:
The amount of penalty cannot be reduced by the court.
But if the obligation have been performed in part to the benefit of the creditor,
and the time fixed for its complete performance be not material, the penalty may
be reduced; unless there is a special agreement to the contrary.
41. Quebec Civil Code article 1078 which provides:
Interest accrued from capital sums also bears interest:
1. When there is a special agreement to that effect;
2. When in any action brought such new interest is specially demanded;
3. When a tutor has received or ought to have received interest upon the moneys
of his pupil and has failed to invest it within the term prescribed by law.
In French this clause is known as clause d'anatocisme.
42. See QUE. CIv. CODE arts. 1077, 1785; see also The Interest Act, QUE. REV. STAT.
ch. 1-18, § 4 (1970). Quebec Civil Code article 1077 provides:
The damages resulting from delay in the payment of money, to which the deb-
tor is liable, consist only of interest at the rate legally agreed upon by the parties,
or, in the absence of such agreement, at the rate fixed by law.
These damages are due without the creditor being obliged .to prove any loss.
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This policy of laissez-faire has given rise to practices which one could
only characterize as abusive. When inflation drives up the commercial
interest rates and hence the return on money lent, the debtor may take
advantage of the difference between the new commercial interest rate and
the agreed upon or legal interest rate. By delaying payment and investing
the amount to be paid, the debtor realizes, possibly at the cost of a law
suit which is settled out of court at the last moment, a profit equal to
the difference of the two interest rates over the period of his stalling.
In these circumstances, he even profits by increasing the delays in court.
One is thus faced with a serious case of moral hazard.
Arguably, under the principle of freedom of contract, the creditor
who has not stipulated an interest rate sufficiently high to discourage this
practice should suffer the consequences of his own foolishness. The law
would thus provide an incentive for people to have proper foresight. The
argument does not do justice to the complexities of real life, however.
First of all, court delays do not affect merely the parties themselves; they
interfere with the administration of justice by creating delays even where
parties or society as a whole have an interest in avoiding them. Society
cannot tolerate abuse of the judicial machinery by a few at the expense
of vast numbers of others. Second, many of the creditors who would
be victims of these stalling games are among those the legislator seeks
to protect because of their inexperience or inferior bargaining power.
These considerations may explain a recent amendment of the Quebec
Civil Code which extends to contract law a rule that has been in force
since 1971 for delictual responsibility. This rule allows the court to award
interest beyond the legal interest rate.43 The new article 1078.1 reads:
They are due from the day of the default only, except in the cases where by
law they are due from the nature of the obligation.
This article does not affect the special rules applicable to bills of exchange and
contracts of suretyship.
Quebec Civil Code article 1785 provides:
Interest upon loans is either legal or conventional.
The rate of legal interest is fixed by law at six per cent yearly.
The rate of conventional interest may be fixed by agreement between the par-
ties, with the exception:
1. Of certain corporations mentioned in the act, intituled: An act respecting
interest, which cannot receive more than the legal rate of six per cent;
2. Of certain other corporations Which are limited as to the rate of interest
by special acts;
3. Of banks, which cannot receive more than seven per cent.
43. Article 1056c of the Quebec Civil Code provides:
The amount awarded by judgment for damages resulting from an offence or
a quasi-offence shall bear interest at the legal rate as from the date when the
action at law was instituted.
There may be added to the amount so awarded an indemnity computed by
applying to the amount, from such date, a percentage equal to the excess of the
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The amount awarded by judgment for the inexecution of an
obligation, except that contemplated in article 1077, bears interest
at the legal rate, or, where such is the case, at the rate lawfully
agreed between the parties, from the date of the institution of
the action.
There may be added to the amount so awarded, or to the
amount awarded by judgment for the inexecution of an obliga-
tion contemplated in article 1077, an indemnity computed by
applying to the amount, from such date, a percentage equal to
the excess of the interest rate fixed according to section 28 of
the Act respecting the Minist~re du revenu (R.S.Q., chapter M-31)
over the legal interest rate, or over the agreed rate, as the case
may be."
When a nonmonetary obligation cannot be performed due to factors
attributable to the debtor, the creditor may claim damages as compensa-
tion. The time at which the damages are to be assessed is the primary
issue. If they are assessed at the time of the breach, fairness dictates that
interest at the commercial rate should be added to them; any lower rate
would lead to the perversities described above. In this light, article 1078.1
constitutes an important new tool of contractual justice. This solution
does not take into account, however, that inflation in the particular market
involved may well be much higher than the general inflation rate. In both
real estate and the construction industry, for example, assessment at the
time of breach with commercial interest would not place the creditor in
the position he would have enjoyed upon proper performance. The
possibility of assessing damages at the date of judgment must therefore
be considered; such a policy amounts to transforming damages into a debt
of value."5 Quebec jurisprudence supports assessment at the date of
judgment."6
The Quebec Civil Code creates debts of value for the purchaser who
suffers eviction. Article 1514 obliges the vendor to pay him the value of
the thing sold at the time of eviction. The same holds true, by virtue
of article 1515, for repairs and improvements made by the purchaser to
the property. If the purchaser is evicted from only part of the thing sold,
interest rate fixed according to section 53 of the Revenue Department Act (Revis-
ed Statutes, 1964, chapter 66) over the legal interest rate.
44. See Act to Amend the Summary Convictions Act, the Code of Civil Procedure
and Other Legislation, G.O.Q. (Gazette officielle du Quebec) pt. 11, at 59, 140 (English
version 1982). The date the article will come into force will be set by proclamation. A
ministerial order of January 1, 1983, G.O.Q. pt. II, at 163 (English version 1983), fixes
the interest rate referred to in the article at 16%.
45. M. TANCELIN, supra note 15, no. 540, at 355.
46. Id.; see also Belisle v. Junior Import & Jewelry Ltd., 1982 Que. C.S. 1064; Remer
Bros. Inv. Corp. v. Robin, 1966 S.C.R. 506; Findlay v. Howard, 58 S.C.R. 516 (1919).
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he is entitled to the value of that part at the time of eviction, not to
a proportional part of the purchase price. In each of these cases, the pur-
chaser is protected against inflation occurring between purchase and
eviction. Hence, the Quebec Civil Code does not ignore the problem of
inflation and correctly puts the burden of it on the negligent debtor-in
this case the vendor. Yet, it would stretch these articles too far to read
in them a general principle that the debtor who fails to perform his obliga-
tion through his own fault bears the burden of inflation until the time
of judgment.
The discussion of these problems is more advanced in the common
law literature 7 than in that of Quebec. An interesting question raised in
the common law literature is whether the creditor of the unperformed
obligation must mitigate the damages resulting from inflation. The ques-
tion is certainly relevant in Quebec, where, in apparent contradiction with
most other civilian jurisdictions, a duty of the creditor to mitigate damages
is explicitly recognized."8 The following hypothetical case will adequately
illustrate the problem: imagine two purchasers of new houses, each of
them victim of a breach of contract on the part of the vendor who sells
and transfers title in the purchased houses to third parties for $100,000
for each house. The first purchaser, upon being informed of the betrayal
of the vendor, turns around and buys an equivalent house at $100,000,
while the other purchaser does nothing with his $100,000. A year later,
judgment is rendered against the vendor. The three houses are now worth
$120,000 each, whereas the commercial interest rate stands at ten per-
cent. Thus, the interest on $100,000 over the relevant period is $10,000.
According to strict classic civil law principles, the first purchaser, having
suffered no damage, has no claim against the vendor. The second pur-
chaser, by contrast, may claim from the vendor the amount necessary
for him to buy an equivalent house at the time of judgment, $20,000
in this case. If the judge takes into account the interest of $10,000 this
purchaser could have realized on the capital theoretically set aside for
the purchase a year earlier, damages would then be limited to $10,000.
The two purchasers now find themselves in positions equivalent to those
they would have had after regular performance of the obligation by the
vendor. In this sense, one's sense of fairness is satisfied; and yet the first
purchaser may be dissatisfied. He may have the uncomfortable feeling
47. See, e.g., Feldman & Libling, Inflation and the Duty to Mitigate, 95 L.Q. REV.
270 (1979); Wallace, Cost of Repair and Inflation, 96 L.Q. REV. 101 (1980); Wallace, Cost
of Repairs: Date for Assessment, 96 L.Q. REV. 341 (1980); Waddams, The Date for the
Assessment of Damages, 97 L.Q. REV. 445 (1981); Wallace, Inflation and Assessment of
Construction Cost Damages, 98 L.Q. REV. 406 (1982); Swan, Damages, Specific Perfor-
mance, Inflation and Interest, 10 REAL PROP. REP. 267 (1980); Paper from John Swan
to the 12th Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, Contract Damages,
Specific Performance and the Calculation of Interest (Oct. 22, 1982).
48. J. BAUDOUIN, LEs OBLIGATIONS no. 567, at 299 (1970).
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that in purchasing the second house he has done the vendor's job even
though the latter is to blame for the difficulties. Obviously, the duty of
mitigating inflation damage may be a source of paradox.
Inexecution may give rise not only to compensation, but also to
dissolution of the contract and restitution. This remedy raises particular
problems if part of the obligation has already been performed. Inflation
may upset the balance between the parts of the obligations that have been
performed on either side and which must now be returned. For instance,
when the sale of a house is dissolved because of latent defects, the vendor
reimburses the purchase price and the purchaser returns the house. The
purchase price has, however, depreciated at the general inflation rate. The
house, on the contrary, has kept its value, barring abuse by the purchaser.
In the case of real estate, the difference may be appreciable, and it benefits
the vendor, the very party who is obviously meant to bear the entire burden
of the latent defects in this instance. Admittedly, the purchaser in good
faith becomes the owner of the fruits by virtue of Quebec Civil Code
article 411; this corresponds to the interest which the vendor simultaneously
realizes on the purchase price. However, the gains attributable to infla-
tion are lost by the purchaser when he returns the house; they go to the
vendor, who returns only the purchase price. An obvious inequality exists,
to the disadvantage of the purchaser seeking dissolution of the sale and
to the advantage of the vendor, particularly the vendor who has stipulated
a giving-in-payment clause 9 in his favor.
The Quebec Civil Code recognizes the problem in part in articles 1514
and 1518." There may be some consolation in that for most classes of
goods, the problem does not arise. Usually, objects sold depreciate through
use while gaining in value as a result of inflation. Although these opposite
movements may not exactly cancel each other out, in practice, to simplify
the task of the courts, it seems justifiable to presume that they do and
to accept that the returned object is still worth its initial purchase price.
49. The giving-in-payment clause is a form of penalty clause created by practitioners
and sanctioned by the courts. It is generally found in hypothec contracts. It gives the creditor
the right, if the debtor fails to meet his obligations, to become full owner of the immovable
on which the hypothec rests, while retaining the payments already made as a penalty.
50. Quebec Civil Code article 1514 provides: "If the thing sold be found, at the time
of eviction, to have increased in value, either by or without the act of the buyer, the seller
is obliged to pay him such increased value over the price at which the sale was made."
Quebec Civil Code article 1518 provides:
If in the case of eviction of a part of the thing, or things sold as a whole,
the sale be not vacated, the buyer has a right to claim from the seller the value
of such part, to be estimated proportionally upon the whole price, and also damages
to be estimated according [sic] the increased value of the thing at the time of
eviction.
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Unequal Relationships
Generally, freedom of contract is still the rule in the law of obliga-
tions, and whatever guidance the Quebec Civil Code provides is subsidiary
law. This legislative restraint has been abandoned in some specific areas
where protective measures are adopted in favor of those thought to be
parties to unequal relationships.
Recent developments in Quebec law, particularly over the past two
decades, indicate that imperative rules are progressively encroaching upon
contractual relations. One might fear for the survival of freedom of con-
tract, indeed of contract itself. Such concern may be dispelled, it is
believed, by a proper analysis of the reasons for legislative intervention.
The interventions are not the result of inflation and are not designed
to be a cure for it. In most instances, they are meant to protect the weak
against certain practices considered reprehensible or to regulate economic
activity in sectors where the free interplay of market forces is thought
to lead to sociaUy unacceptable outcomes. Be that as it may, these rules
may well incidentally affect the ways in which people face up to inflation.
Traditionally, the Quebec Civil Code has been limited to protecting
such parties as the insane and minors. This protection is accomplished
through, among other things, the annulment of contracts entered into by
such parties, on the grounds of lack of consent or lesion.' The concept
of lesion is very broad and covers "any patrimonial prejudice a contract-
ing party suffers as a result of a juridical act." 5 2 In principle, the concept
could serve to correct a variety of inequitable situations involving persons
who have reached the age of majority. Quebec Civil Code article 1012,
however, excludes this group categorically: "Persons of the age of majority
are not entitled to relief from their contracts for cause of lesion only."
The principle embodied in article 1012 is tempered by some excep-
tions. Quebec law has permitted judicial intervention in favor of persons
of age because of lesion in cases of pressured out-of-court settlements
and money loans. In 1939, legislation was introduced to make unen-
forceable against those who have suffered bodily injuries the settlements
to which they may have agreed within fifteen days of the act causing
the injuries.' 3 The purpose of this legislation was to stop abusive practices
by insurance companies which took advantage of the state of accident
victims. In 1964, the legislator acted again and introduced an entire new
section into the Quebec Civil Code (articles 1040a to 1040e) to deal with
usury in money loans. This section was given the significant title: "Of
51. QuE. CIV. CODE arts. 995-1012.
52. J. BAUDOUtN, supra note 48, no. 152, at 91.
53. QUE. Crv. CODE art. 1056b; J. BAUDOUIN, supra note 48, no. 155, at 93.
19841
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
equity in certain contracts." 4 Article 1040c is of particular interest and
reads:
The monetary obligations under a loan of money may be re-
duced or annulled by a court so far as it finds that, having regard
to the risk and to all the circumstances, they make the cost of
the loan excessive and the operation harsh and unconscionable.
For such purpose, the court must consider all the obligations
resulting from the loan in relation to the sum actually advanced
by the lender notwithstanding any settlement of account, novation
or transaction.
Without using the term, the legislator introduced a very broad form of
lesion, based purely on fairness. 5 The judge has the power not only to
annul a contract, but also to alter its terms in order to reduce the debtor's
obligation. The article applies to all loans, whether commercial, personal
or hypothecary. 6 It is interesting to note that Quebec Civil Code article
1149,"' which implicitly recognizes usury, has not been repealed. In case
of conflict, article 1040c will undoubtedly prevail. In practice, cases in-
volving article 1040c are rare, and those in which the courts have in fact
intervened in a contract are even rarer. 8 Apparently, the courts are reluc-
tant to exercise the broad discretionary power which article 1040c grants
them.
Some authors have attempted to show *a link between article 1040c
and inflation. 9 Historically and systematically, such a link seems tenuous.
54. This section was inspired by legislation in common law jurisdictions, particularly
Ontario's Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 514 (1980), which
in turn draws on the earlier Moneylenders Acts of 1900 and 1927 in Britain. The constitu-
tional validity of the Ontario act appears to be well-established since the Supreme Court's
decision in Attorney General of Ontario v. Barfield Enterprises Ltd., 1963 S.C.R. 570.
55. J. BAUDOUIN, supra note 48, no. 157, at 94.
56. Morris, De l'6quitd dans certains contrats, 25 QuE. B. RaV. 65 (1965).
57. Article 1149 of the Quebec Civil Code provides:
A debtor cannot compel his creditor to receive payment of his debt in parts,
even if the debt be divisible.
Nor can the court in any case by its judgment order a debt actually payable
to be paid by instalments without the consent of the creditor.
However, if the debt is made up of interest exceeding the legal rate, and seems
to the court to be usurious, or if it includes such interest, whether such interest
is called interest or be claimed under the name of discount, reduction in the ad-
vance, commission or otherwise, such court may order that such usurious interest,
or such portion of usurious interest, be paid by instalments, and fix the amount
of such instalments and their term of payment, at its discretion, according to
circumstances.
58. See Les Agences Lyon, Inc. v. Cadim, 16 CAntERS DE D. 147 (1975), discussed
in I A. LAROUCHE, LES OBLIGATIONS: THEORIE GENERALE DES CONTRATS, QUASI-CONTRATS no.
139, at 160-63 (1982).
59. Tancelin, supra note 16, at 424; Garon & Royer, supra note 1, at 411.
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Article 1040c was adopted during a period of economic stability-when
inflation was not a public concern-and it forms part of a section whose
purpose it is to protect the debtor, not the creditor. Yet the effect of
inflation upon a debt is to make it less burdensome for the debtor, not
more so, since a debtor reimburses in depreciated money. However, the
lender may have made excessively pessimistic forecasts of inflation and
insisted on an excessive interest rate. The unfairness may have been obvious
from the outset; more likely, however, it will appear subsequently as in-
flation turns out to be lower than foreseen.
One difficulty with applying article 1040c to such situations is that
lesion is held to be a vice at the formation stage of the contract.6" In
the cases of interest in these situations, the inequity becomes evident only
as a result of events taking place after the formation of the contract.
Normally, such problems would lie in the realm of imprdvision,6l which
is not accepted in Quebec law as a ground for revising contracts.62 Perhaps
support could be found in the very general wording of article 1040c, which
directs the judge to take all the circumstances into account. Thus, he could
consider as one of those circumstances the inexperience of the borrower,
or more precisely, his inability to foresee inflation adequately.63 The judge
60. Tancelin, supra note 16, at 422. Elsewhere Tancelin writes:
It should be noted that neither the Act of 1964 [QuE. Crv. CODE art. 1040c],
nor the Act of 1971 [Consumer Protection Act, QUE. STAT. ch. 74, § 118 (1971),
replaced by the 1978 Consumer Protection Act, QUE. REV. STAT. ch. P-40.1, §§
8-9] are applications of this theory [of the impr6vision]. These Acts do not authorize
a judge to revise a contract which has become unfair as a result of changing
economic conditions; they only authorize him to annul or reduce the obligations
of the borrower or consumer who has entered into a contract which was exorbi-
tant or disproportionate at the time of contracting .... [T]hese Acts are aimed
at correcting an excessive disequilibrium at the time of contract formation, not
a disequilibrium which has developed during the course of the contract that was
fair to begin with.
M. TANCELIN, supra note 15, no. 172, at 115 (writers' translation). Baudouin considers it
"an abuse . . . of terms at which the contract was entered into." J. BAUDOUIN, supra
note 48, no. 153, at 93 (writers' translation). See also Perron v. HFC of Canada, 1977
Que. C.P. 402.
61. See infra text accompaning notes 80-81.
62. J. BAUDOUIN, supra note 48, no. 579, at 305; M. TANCELIN, supra note 15, no.
172, at 115; Frank Ross Constr. v. Verona Constr., 1961 S.C.R. 195. However, the draft
of the new Civil Code of Quebec proposes the acceptance of the concept of imprdvision
in exceptional circumstances. See CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, I REPORT ON THE QUEBEC
CIVIL CODE: THE DRAFT CIVIL CODE bk. V, art. 75 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Report].
63. Since Quebec Civil Code article 1040c draws its origin from section 2 of Ontario's
Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 514 (1980), a quote from
a commentary from that province is appropriate. The commentary states that the test of
unconscionability must be made at "the time of agreement, but the subsequent events are
relevant in determining the true meaning of the agreement and in making apparent its latent
unfairness." S. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 337 (1977). In Nadeau v. Nadeau, 1977
Que. C.A. 248, the court adopted the broad interpretation of Quebec Civil Code article 1040a.
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is obviously in a predicament when the borrower asks him to revise the
contract. If he revises when inflation is less than anticipated, but does
not, in the absence of a statutory provision to that effect, in the opposite
case, the inflation risk for the lender increases. This leads to higher in-
terest rates, and hence to more corrective intervention, and so on. It is
questionable whether the judge is really equipped to make the appropriate
calculations in order to determine if the interest rate, considering all risk
factors, is fair. Unquestionably, market rates adequately reflect the general
risks, but risks which are specific to the borrower must be assessed
otherwise.
Arguably, it may be simpler to adopt legislation authorizing any
borrower of money to repay his loan at any time without penalty. Such
legislation would allow him to refinance his debt when lower than ex-
pected interest rates make this option attractive to him. 6 Such a provi-
sion already exists, for a particular case, in section 93 of the Consumer
Protection Act.6" Under such a rule, competition may be expected to en-
sure to each borrower the lowest interest rate compatible with his par-
ticular risk pattern. Lesion provisions might then be reserved for gross
abuse of patent inexperience of the borrower.
The Consumer Protection Act66 is best seen as a graft upon the body
of the civil law found in the Quebec Civil Code. It restricts, for merchant-
consumer relationships,67 the force of the principles underlying the civil
law: autonomy, freedom of contract, consensualism and the binding force
of contracts. These restrictions are only intended to reestablish a reasonable
measure of equality of bargaining power between the parties by assisting
the weaker and should be interpreted only to apply to the extent necessary
to protect the consumer. 6 They are part of what in the French legal
literature is called the ordre public dconomique de protection,69 and they
are imperative law in the sense that parties may not contractually derogate
from provisions that ensure minimal protection to the consumer. Beyond
this minimum, however, freedom of contract returns.
A few provisions of the Act may have a bearing on problems of
inflation." Sections 8 and 9 of the Act contain very general lesion
64. The analysis equally applies to situations of deflation or sudden drop of interest
rates, as have occurred since the autumn of 1982.
65. QuE. REV. STAT. ch. P-40.1, § 93.
66. Id.
67. QUE. REv. STAT. ch. P-40.1, § 2 reads: "This act applies to every contract for
goods or services entered into between a consumer and a merchant in the course of his
business."
68. See Consumer Protection Act, QuE. REV. STAT. ch. P-40.1, §§ 35, 262, 270.
69. 4 J. CARBONNIER, supra note 31, no. 33, at 111; 1I J. GHESTIN, TRAITE DE DROIT
CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS, LE CONTRAT nos. 122-23, at 86-88 (1980).
70. On Quebec consumer law, see generally Dagenais, Lalande, Roy-Lauzon, Lebeau,
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provisions.' The scope of these provisions goes beyond that of Quebec
Civil Code article 1040c in that they cover all goods and services pro-
vided by merchants to consumers. The analysis presented earlier points
to the difficulties in applying these provisions to inflation problems.72 In
duration and credit contracts, it is the merchant, the creditor of the
monetary obligation, who bears the inflation risk. He will protect himself
against inflation by stipulating either a higher interest rate or an indexing
clause. The lesion provision may come into play when these anti-inflation
measures are excessively harsh for the consumer who did not fully under-
stand their impact at the time of entering into the contract. The wording
of section 8 is broad enough to allow the judge to take into account the
possible disproportion of the obligations of the parties at the time of per-
formance, when such disproportion may have resulted from changing cir-
cumstances caused by inflation.73 Section 93 permits costless payment of
debts before maturity in credit contracts. Another protective measure is
found in variable credit contracts, those that govern credit cards, for ex-
ample. Interest rates on the unpaid balance may only be increased after
six months notice by the lender, who is the card issuer in most cases.7
Finally, inflation may be taken into account in installment contracts
(conditional sales contracts). If the purchaser defaults, the merchant is
not allowed simply to repossess the object sold, but must follow certain
formalities. In the case in which the consumer has already paid more than
half of the total sum, the merchant may repossess only with permission
of the court.75 The judge deciding the issue must take into account a
number of factors listed in section 109, one of which is "the value of
the goods at the time of the consumer's default." 76 Conceivably, the object
Masse, Morel & Vignola, Cahier 5: La consommation, in GUIDE D'INFORMATION EN DROIT
(Soquij 1978); N. L'HEUREUX, DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION (1981).
71. Sections 8 and 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, QuE. REV. STAT. ch. P-40.1,
provide:
8. The consumer may demand the nullity of a contract or a reduction in his
obligations thereunder where the disproportion between the respective obligations
of the parties is so great as to amount to exploitation of the consumer or where
the obligation of the consumer is excessive, harsh or unconscionable.
9. Where the court must determine whether a consumer consented to a con-
tract, it shall consider the condition of the parties, the circumstances in which
the contract was entered into and the benefits arising from the contract for the
consumer.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
73. Section 8 should be read distinctly from section 9. Since they are not written as
two paragraphs of a single article, they should not be linked more closely by interpretation.
74. See Consumer Protection Act, QUE. REV. STAT. ch. P-40.1, § 129.
75. See id. ch. P-40.1, § 142.
76. See id. ch. P-40.1, §§ 109, 143. These sections read as follows:
109. The motion must be heard and decided by preference, considering, in par-
ticular, the following facts:
(a) the total of amounts that the consumer must disburse under the contract;
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has depreciated little in nominal value or even has appreciated a little
in spite of its use, in which case the court might refuse to authorize the
merchant to repossess it.
Section 109 is also applicable to sales contracts involving credit which
contain a clause of forfeiture of the benefit of the term. The consumer
in default may ask the court to change the terms of payment as it deems
reasonable or to authorize him to return the good to the merchant, thus
extinguishing his obligation." The court, when deciding upon the con-
sumer's request, takes into account, among other things, the value of the
purchased good. Undoubtedly, this section was meant to prevent consumers
from extinguishing their debts by returning purchased goods which have
become worthless. Nevertheless, it could also be used by the courts to
prevent consumers in distress from returning goods whose value is still
a multiple of the balance to be paid.
Unforeseeable Inflation
A typical lawyer would distinguish foreseeable from unforeseeable in-
flation by referring to the test of the bon pre de famille (prudent
administrator): inflation is unforeseeable where a normally prudent and
diligent person placed in similar circumstances would not have been able
to foresee it. To give more specific content to such a formula, one might
consider that a prudent person would expect inflation to be similar to
what it has been in the immediate past. He might further draw ideas from
the return on such things as government savings bonds, which take
expected inflation into account. Hence, only sudden increases in the price
level would be unforeseeable. In Quebec in 1982, an inflation rate of
around ten percent over the next twelve months would be foreseeable on
the basis of experience over the past years and publicly available
information.78 An inflation rate of twenty percent or more, as exists in
some South American countries,79 would be considered unforeseeable in
Quebec.
(b) the sums already paid;
(c) the value of the goods at the time of the consumer's default;
(d) the balance due to the merchant;
(e) the consumer's ability to pay; and
(f) the reason for which the consumer is in default.
143. Such permission is applied for by a motion served on the consumer which
must be heard and decided by preference.
The court shall dispose of such motion after taking into account the facts men-
tioned in section 109.
77. See id. ch. P-40.1, § 110. It reads: "The return of the goods to the merchant
authorized by virtue of section 107 extinguishes the consumer's contractual obligation and
the merchant is not bound to return the amount of the payments he has received."
78. Since the autumn of 1982, the general inflation rate has been falling steadily. See
supra note 1.
79. See K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 6.
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The law offers various solutions to contracting parties in the case of
unforeseeable inflation. The first is judicial intervention based on
imprevision; the second is special legislation. The doctrine of imprevision
concerns situations where performance of the obligation, while not entirely
impossible, has become much more burdensome than was initially an-
ticipated as a result of changing circumstances. The contract, which may
have constituted a fair exchange at the outset, no longer does so at the
time of performance. According to this doctrine, the debtor is justified
under those circumstances to refuse to perform. In other words, every
contract is presumed to contain an implied rebus sic stantibus clause: the
debtor is obliged to perform only if the essential conditions contemplated
at the time of entering into the agreement have not changed.8 " The conse-
quences of a change vary according to the source consulted. For some,
a change gives rise to dissolution or resolution of the contract upon de-
mand; for others, the courts have the power to modify the contract,
without the contract losing its validity.'
The sudden increase in the price of all goods or of one particular
good is perhaps the most obvious case in which the doctrine of imprevision
would apply. Unanticipated increases in the prices of raw materials or
fuel used by a manufacturer are a prime example.82 The difficulties facing
a German builder who undertook to construct and deliver a building for
a fixed price, not anticipating the period of hyperinflation his country
went through in the early 1920's, is an imaginable example.
Quebec law has not accepted the doctrine of impr~vision.8 3 Only for-
tuitous events which render performance entirely impossible will free the
debtor of his obligation.8 ' Where a change in circumstance makes it more
onerous for the debtor to perform, without making it impossible, the
debtor must perform and the court has no power even to alleviate his
obligation. It may only intervene in the agreement where special legisla-
tion, derogating from civil law principles laid down in the Code, express-
80. See Mignault, La frustration du contrat, 2 R. DU B. 387 (1942) & 21 CAN. B.
REV. 32 (1943); Bohemier & Fox, De l'effet du changement de circonstances sur les contrats
dans le droit civil qudbdcois et en common law, 42 R.J.T. 77 (1962).
81. See K. ROSENN, supra note 3, at 84; Bohemier & Fox, supra note 80, at 81-83.
82. For a dramatic example, see Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market
and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977).
83. J. BAUDOUIN, supra note 48, no. 579, at 305; M. TANCELIN, supra note 15, at
114-16. The Cour de cassation of France has also refused to accept the doctrine of imprevision.
B. STARCK, DROIT CIVIL-OBLIGATIONS no. 1919, at 568 (1972) (summarizes the position
of the court with respect to the various arguments in support of the doctrine of imprdvision:
an implied clause rebus sic stantibus does not exist; equity and good faith are principles
of interpretation and cannot be used to modify a clear contract; to insist on performance
of a contract is not an abuse of right; there is no unjustified enrichment, since the justifica-
tion (cause) is the contract itself; there is no force majeure, which presupposes impossibility
to perform, whereas there is only great difficulty to do so).
84. J. BAUDOUIN, supra note 48, no. 579, at 305.
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ly authorizes it to do so," but such exceptions are narrowly construed.
In principle, the courts respect the binding force of contracts. Several
authors have criticized Quebec law on this point, and one author has sug-
gested that the courts could base the doctrine of imprvision on the general
principle of equity expressed in Quebec Civil Code article 1024,86 which
provides: "The obligation of a contract extends not only to what is ex-
pressed in it, but also to all the consequences which, by equity, usage
or law, are incident to the contract, according to its nature." This article
authorizes the court to complete and interpret contracts on the basis of
equity. The article does not, however, authorize the court to construe the
contract against the express agreement of the parties. Another author has
proposed to introduce into Quebec law a general mechanism of judicial
revision of obligations based on equity. 7 The proposal would put an end
to the current practice of multiplying the special cases in which an act
authorizes the courts to intervene in contracts.
Would judicial intervention be a better response to acute inflation
than across-the-board legislative revalorization of debts? At first blush,
the courts would seem to be better able to take account of the particular
circumstances of each case, such as the extent to which parties already
took inflation into account when entering into the contract. Whether such
confidence in the judicial process is justified remains to be seen. The
sources of information open to the courts surely do not adequately prepare
them for the delicate task of adjusting contracts undermined by inflation.
Whether a judge is capable of assessing the impact upon the economy
as a whole of his decision to grant full indexing in one instance is ques-
tionable. One may wonder whether fairness in the individual case, as the
courts can express it, should prevail over consideration of economy-wide
efficiency which the legislator can bring to bear in the fight against infla-
tion. In most countries trying to cope with inflation of such a magnitude,
judicial and legislative revalorization of debts seem to coexist. 8
Since Canada has had remarkable economic stability over the past
decades, it is not surprising that Canadian legislation contains no perma-
nent mechanism to deal with serious economic crises. Federal as well as
provincial governments have coped with each crisis through ad hoc legisla-
85. See QuE. Civ. CODE art. 1040c; Consumer Protection Act, QUE. REV. STAT. ch.
P-40.1, § 8, quoted supra note 71. Even these articles cover imprdvision oily if one accepts
the thesis that they apply not only to cases of initial disequilibrium, but also to those that
occur as a result of changes during the course of the contract.
86. See Colas, La notion d'equit dans I'interprdtation des contrats, 83 R. DU N. 391
(1981).
87. Guy, De la justice dans les contrats, 71 R. DU N. 463 (1968). This proposal has
been accepted in the draft of the new Civil Code of Quebec. See Report, supra note 62,
bk. V, art. 75.
88. K. RosENN, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 95.
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tion. One recent example of such federal legislation was the Anti-Inflation
Act, assented to on December 15, 1975.89 The preamble of the Act
recognized that "inflation in Canada at current levels is contrary to the
interests of all Canadians and that the containment and reduction of in-
flation has become a matter of serious national concern." The Act placed
restraints on wages, prices, profit margins, dividends and compensation
in Canada. On March 10, 1976, Quebec became the seventh province to
sign an agreement with the federal government making the Anti-Inflation
Act applicable to all sectors within its jurisdiction.
As far as the civil law is concerned, the controls obviously constituted
an encroachment on freedom of contract. The price of a good or service
was no longer determined by the contracting parties alone but was sub-
ject to administrative approval. Similarly, individual and collective labor
agreements were subject to a commission's approval after the Act came
into force. Except for minor retroactive effects, the Act looked to the
future. This approach is very different from that which involves revaloriz-
ing existing debts in order to preserve the purchasing power of capital.
The anti-inflation program appears to aim at the causes of inflation, rather
than merely at the symptoms.
Legislation such as the Anti-Inflation Act remains exceptional. In prin-
ciple, the legislator does not interfere with freedom of contract, leaving
it to the parties to protect themselves against foreseeable inflation. A very
different approach, however, is taken with respect to involuntary creditors.
INVOLUNTARY LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
Involuntary legal relationships are distinctive from voluntary legal rela-
tionships in that, since the creditor does not acquire his claim against
the debtor by contract, he is not at liberty to arrange it according to
his preferences and to protect himself against inflation, even predictable
inflation. Unless the creditor is expected to support the inflation risk,
judicial or legislative intervention is essential to transfer that risk onto
the debtor.
Involuntary legal relationships arise from delicts or quasi-delicts or
from the direct operation of the law under Quebec Civil Code article 1057,
which provides:
Obligations result in certain cases from the sole and direct opera-
tion of law, without the intervention of any act, and independently
of the will of the person obliged or of him in whose favor the
obligation is imposed.
89. 1974-75-76 CAN. STAT. ch. 75; see also Decary, Vers une nouvelle Loi anti-inflation?,
La Presse (Montreal) July 14, 1982, at A6.
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Such are the obligations of tutors and other administrators who
cannot refuse the charge cast upon them;
The obligation of children to furnish the necessaries of life to
their indigent parents;
Certain obligations of owners of adjoining properties;
The obligations which in certain cases arise from fortuitous
events;
And others of a like nature.
An important example of the latter case is alimony. One may object that
alimony results from what was a voluntary contract at the outset-the
contract of marriage. Such an objection would stretch the meaning of
freedom of contract far beyond its normal limits. The current idea of
marriage excludes the possibility of requiring future spouses to settle the
effects of a possible divorce before their marriage. Current law in Canada
forbids the settlement of future claims for alimony by marriage contract.
Hence, for alimentary creditors, as for other involuntary creditors, judicial
or other intervention is essential if they are to be protected against
inflation.
Those who suffer damage without a contractual link with the
perpetrator generally have recourse against the latter under the chapter
"Of offences and Quasi-offences" in the Quebec Civil Code.90 Within
this group, the persons who stand to lose most as a result of inflation
are those who have sustained physical injury. Physical injuries frequently
have consequences throughout the victim's life, and the compensation
thereof raises delicate problems for the courts under ordinary civil law. 9'
For some specific groups, the legislature has set up exceptional compen-
sation schemes, which are less generous than the ordinary civil law, but
which afford better protection against inflation.92
In an ordinary delictual responsibility action, the victim may claim
two kinds of damages: compensation for losses suffered and damages for
the delays by his debtor in paying damages of the first kind. Compensa-
tion damages raise the problem of assessment; for damages due to delay,
the relevant issue is the applicable interest rate.
A victim should be compensated for both present and future damages
he may suffer. Present damages may cover, for instance, the loss resulting
from the destruction of some good. Future damages may consist in earn-
ings foregone as a result of physical injuries leading to permanent in-
90. QUE. CIV. CODE arts. 1053, 1056d.
91. Gendrel, Influence de la ddprdciation mon4taire sur le droit la responsabilitg civile,
in INFLUENCE DE LA DEPRiCIATION MONETAIRE SUR LA VIE JURIDIQUE PRIViE 143 (P. Durand
ed. 1961).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 112-18.
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capacity. Where compensation is claimed for the loss of a good, the courts
must decide at what time the damages are to be assessed: at the time
of the loss, at the time the action is brought, at the time of the hearing
ov at the time of judgment. Indeed, the assessment could be made at
the time of the final judgment on appeal or even at the time of execution
of this judgment. The question is academic in times of economic stability;
in inflationary times, however, the question is highly relevant since the
value of the lost good, expressed in depreciating currency, increases steadily
at the pace of inflation. The later the damages are assessed, the more
the creditor benefits; the earlier it is done, the more the debtor benefits.93
The date of assessment is equally relevant in cases concerning goods whose
value fluctuates, such as a shipload of petroleum or bars of gold.
Two principles must be kept in mind in answering the question of
when damages should be assessed. First, the victim creditor is entitled
to full compensation of his loss. Second, he is not entitled to enrich himself
at the expense of the debtor by receiving money damages the value of
which exceeds his loss. Arguably, such an enrichment does not occur even
where the sum of money necessary to compensate the victim at the time
of judgment is higher than it was at the time of the loss, if the difference
is due to inflation. The value of the loss has remained constant; only
its monetary equivalent has increased as a result of inflation.
In order to ensure full compensation to the victim, Quebec courts
have tended to push forward the date of assessment of damage to the
time of the trial. They award the sum necessary to replace the loss as
it is established during the trial. Their aim appears to be to restore the
victim to his original position.9" Assessment does not take place at the
time of the judgment. In rendering judgment, the court is bound by the
evidence produced during the trial as regards the value of the good. This
value may have increased between the hearing and the date of judgment,
but recommencing the production of evidence on the subject would not
be feasible. Hence, the trial judge establishes the value of a good at the
time of the hearing. Courts of appeal, bound by the evidence produced
at the trial level, follow the same rule. The practice of assessing damages
at the time of the trial puts the burden of inflation until that time upon
the debtor. This rule is only fair since the victim has done nothing to
become creditor. He should, therefore, be shielded as much as possible
from the effects of inflation.
A less frequent occurrence is one in which a good loses value be-
tween the date of the loss and trial. For example, a shipload of petroleum
may be destroyed on the way to the harbor where it was to be sold at
93. 3 J. CARBONNIER, supra note 7, no. 8, at 30.
94. Tancelin, supra note 16, at 421; J. BAUDOUIN, LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE
DELICTUELLE nos. 128-29, at 97 (1973); Pratt v. Beaman, 1930 S.C.R. 284.
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a good price the next morning. The court should again aim at restoring
the creditor to the position he would have had in the absence of the
mishap. To accomplish this goal, the court should take into account the
use to which the good was to be put. Since the petroleum was to be sold
immediately, the proper damages are not the value of the same quantity
of petroleum, but rather the price for which the party could expect to
sell it at the agreed date. When petroleum prices tend to drop, the dif-
ference may be appreciable. Similarly, where gold has been bought for
speculative purposes and not for immediate resale, the proper damages
are not the price for which it could be sold at the time of the loss, but
rather the replacement value at the time of the trial. In this manner, the
victim recovers his speculative position.
These few examples show that the principle of restitutio in integrum"
gives rise to varying solutions in inflationary times. If the party who suf-
fered the loss would still be in possession of the good had the accident
not taken place, he should have a debt of value against the person who
inflicted that loss. Such debts follow the value of the good involved, which
may well change at a pace which differs from the general inflation or
deflation rate. The assessment of the damages should, therefore, take place
at the time of the trial. If, however, the party suffering the loss had the
intention of selling the good between the time of the loss and trial, the
assessment should take place at the time of the intended sale, and the
sum should bear interest from that date.
Quebec law does not presently permit an accident victim who has sus-
tained physical injuries to be compensated by means of an annuity con-
sisting in periodic payments subject to revision as the circumstances of
the victim or the economy in general change. The entire amount of the
damages to be paid, including the losses which the victim will suffer in
the future as a result of the accident, are to be expressed in a lump sum. 6
The assessment of future damages in a lump sum has the advantage of
settling disputes once and for all. This policy entails fewer costs for the
courts and, hence, for society as a whole, than would a scheme permitting
revision of periodic payments where circumstances warrant. Moreover, it
has the advantage of creating incentives for the victim to return to active
life as soon as possible.97 Although these advantages are readily apparent,
they are offset by the inevitable imprecision in judicial evaluation of lump
sums. The measurement of the incapacity sustained is already a process
fraught with difficulties which are frequently resolved by rather arbitrary
decisions. The forecasting of inflation for the rest of the victim's life is
virtually within the realm of the occult sciences.
95. "Restoration or restitution to the previous condition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1180 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
96. J. BAUDOUIN, supra note 94, no. 125, at 94 & no. 141, at 105.
97. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 144 (2d ed. 1977).
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The procedure generally followed contains the following steps:
(1) Determine the percentage of permanent incapacity of the
victim;
(2) Determine his working life expectancy;
(3) Determine his expected average revenues during the remainder
of his working life;
(4) Compute the proportion of these revenues of which the vic-
tim will be deprived as result of the injury;
(5) Compute the lump sum which has to be paid in order to
produce an annuity equivalent to the lost revenues and which will
be exhausted at the end of the victim's active life;
(6) Reduce this sum by a certain amount because of hazards of
life.9
Inflation comes into this procedure at steps three (determination of future
earnings) and five (calculation of a lump sum).
To determine future revenues of the plaintiff, the courts must estimate
expected revenues for each of the remaining years in his working life.
Several sources of uncertainty affect these estimates, and inflation is one
of them. Inflation also enters into the estimate of the lump sum necessary
to replace the lost revenues. The capital sum must be depleted at the end
of the victim's working life, since he is entitled to full compensation, but
no more. The estimate of the sum presupposes that the interest rate at
which the victim can invest it during his working life is known.
The courts are not at liberty to refuse to grant judgment on the ground
that estimating the loss of future revenues due to permanent incapacity
would be difficult. They have developed, from their own experience and
with the aid of experts, a set of principles and rules of thumb to guide
them in estimating lump sums. Inflation appears to have played havoc
with these rules in recent times.
The debate centers on the discount rate to be applied in estimating
the lump sum to be paid which is to produce periodic payments over
a long period. The Supreme Court of Canada, in three recent, severely
criticized cases, placed the discount rate at seven percent.99 Mr. Justice
98. See HWritiers Nadeau v. Savard, 1972 Que. C.A. 802. Several cases recognize the
principle that inflation or the depreciation of money should be taken into account in
establishing the awards. How this should be done is not well established. See Riel v. Mur-
ren, 1972 Que. C.A. 367; Coca-Cola v. Driver, 1960 Que. C.B.R. 313; Pelletier v. Voyageurs,
1972 Que. C.A. 795.
99. Andrews v. Grand & Toy, 2 S.C.R. 229 (1978); Arnold v. Teno, 2 S.C.R. 287
(1978); Thornton v. Board of School Trustees, 2 S.C.R. 267 (1978); see also Braniff &
Pratt, Tragedy in the Supreme Court of Canada: New Developments in the Assessment
of Damages for Personal Injuries, 37 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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Dickson arrived at this figure by subtracting from the average return on
invested capital at the time, which he put at 10.5°0o, an inflation factor
of 3.5%.1"' Two recent decisions of the Superior Court of Quebec have
put the discount rate at three percent.' 0' The economic evidence put before
the court in these two cases appears to have been more sophisticated than
that which was submitted to the Supreme Court. The superior court should
have stated its reasons for deviating from the earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions more convincingly.' The issue is quite important because a high
discount rate favors the defendant, the party who caused the accident,
and a low rate is favorable to the victim. In one of the cases in which
the Supreme Court had to decide the issue, a discount rate of seven per-
cent would lead to a lump sum of $641,713, whereas at three percent
the victim would have received $1,109,373."' 3
The argument for adopting the three percent discount rate rests on
the observation that in the long run, the difference between the inflation
rate and the return on risk-free investment tends to remain constant. Over
the past thirty years, this difference has fluctuated between 1.1% and
2.4%. 114 This observation aids in calculating the proper discount rate
without knowledge of either the inflation rate or the return on capital.
The discount rate should be set at the best estimate of the gap between
these two rates. The three percent figure adopted by the Superior Court
appears to reflect such a policy, allowing for a small correction repre-
senting an error margin in favor of the victim. While this figure is arguably
the correct one, it leads to substantial lump sums and will undoubtedly
give rise to protests due to misunderstanding, such as those voiced a few
years ago.0 5
This solution of taking the difference between inflation and the return
on risk-free capital without actually knowing either is seductively simple.
One author has proposed that the Supreme Court adopt a discount rate
along these lines in a decision of principle or policy statement, to avoid
needless repetition of economic evidence in thousands of similar cases.10 6
Yet the same author submits that the solution cannot be quite so simple
since the tax situation of the victim, which may substantially affect the
lump sum required to replace lost revenues, should also be accounted for
if the principle of full compensation, but no more, is to be respected.107
100. See Andrews v. Grand & Toy, 2 S.C.R. 229, 258-59 (1978).
101. Dugal v. Procureur Gdn~ral du Qu6bec, 1979 Que. C.S. 617; Campeau v. Socit6
Radio-Canada, 1979 Que. C.S. 637.
102. See Dugal v. Procureur G~n~ral du Quebec, 1979 Que. C.S. 617, 628; Campeau
v. Socit6 Radio-Canada, 1979 Que. C.S. 637, 643-44.
103. Rea, supra note 13, at 284.
104. See authorities cited supra note 13; cases cited supra note 101.
105. DeGrandpr6, Skyrocketing Awards, 26 QuE. B. RE. 17 (1966).
106. Rea, supra note 13, at 285.
107. Id. at 286-87; see also Landsea, How Workable Are Net Discount Rates, 28 MCGILL
L.J. 102 (1982).
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Once the court has fixed the damages to which the victim is entitled
for present and future losses, it cannot intervene again to adjust the
amount for the inflation which occurs between the judgment and its
execution. The creditor-victim is, however, protected by a different
mechanism, namely the interest due on unpaid damages as provided for
in Quebec Civil Code article 1056c. Until 1971, the first paragraph of
article 1056c stipulated an interest rate of five percent.'" This rate was
obviously insufficient; certain classes of debtors (primarily insurance com-
panies) made profits by adopting the practice of delaying the payment
of indemnities to their victims. To stop this abuse, the legislature added
a second paragraph to article 1056c authorizing the courts to supplement
this legal interest rate in order to make it equal to the rate charged to
delinquent taxpayers under the Revenue Department Act.'"9 Under this
new rule, the interest rate has passed from eight percent in January 1972,
to ten percent in May 1977, to fifteen percent in April 1980, to nineteen
percent in January 1982 and back to sixteen percent in January 1983.110
In contrast to the legal interest rate of five percent, the additional
indemnity provided for in the second paragraph of article 1056c is not
granted to the creditor automatically. He must ask for it, and the court
has discretion to grant it. In practice, the discretion is limited to deciding
whether, all circumstances taken into account, the victim has forfeited
the benefit of this indemnity, totally or in part, for a cause attributable
to him, such as unduly delaying the trial. This mechanism, surely essen-
tial in preventing abuse in inflationary times, has very recently been
extended to all damages, whatever their source.'"
The ordinary rules of civil responsibility have made way, in a number
of areas, for special compensation plans aimed at victims for whom the
ordinary recourses of civil law are too onerous and hence ineffective, and
who, as a result, have become social problems. Such plans have been
instituted for victims of industrial accidents,'' 2 for victims of criminal
acts,'' 3 for victims of automobile accidents" 4 and for victims of accidents
related to acts of good citizenship."' For industrial and automobile
108. See QuE. CIV. CODE arts. 1077, 1785, quoted supra note 42; Interest Act, CAN.
REV. STAT. ch. 1-18, § 4 (1970).
109. QuE. REV. STAT. ch. M-31.
110. See Order in Council 3784-72, Dec. 13, 1972, G.O.Q. pt. II, at 11759 (English
version 1972); Order in Council 1442-77, May 4, 1977, G.O.Q. pt. I1, at 2325 (English
version 1977); Order in Council 936-80, Mar. 26, 1980, G.O.Q. pt. 11, at 1535 (English
version 1980); Order in Council 3347-81, Dec. 2, 1981, G.O.Q. pt. 11, at 4008 (English
version 1981); Ministerial Ordinance, Jan. 1, 1983, G.O.Q. pt. II, at 85 (English version 1983).
111. See supra note 44.
112. Workmen's Compensation Act, QuE. REV. STAT. ch. A-3; An act respecting oc-
cupational health and safety, Qua. REV. STAT. ch. S-2.1.
113. Crime Victims Compensation Act, Qua. REV. STAT. ch. 1-6.
114. Automobile Insurance Act, QuE. REV. STAT. ch. A-25.
115. An act to promote good citizenship, QUE. REV. STAT. ch. C-20.
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accidents, the ordinary recourse against the responsible party has been
eliminated in principle." ' The other two plans are optional and are com-
plementary to the ordinary civil law.
The indemnities awarded under these plans differ in two important
respects from those available under ordinary civil law. First, they are lower,
but all victims are compensated without delay. Second, those who suffer
permanent loss of future earnings are given awards in the form of periodic
payments as opposed to a lump sum. This last feature makes it possible
to protect the beneficiaries of these acts against the consequences of in-
flation. The acts provide for revalorization of both the periodic payments
and the guidelines for establishing the indemnity. For example, the max-
imum admissible revenue for the purpose of the calculation of the in-
demnity under the Automobile Insurance Act has risen from $18,000 in
1978, when the Act came into force,'"7 to $26,000 currently."'
Although the benefits awarded under these acts are indexed to an
extent, the complaint is frequently made that they are insufficient in that
they do not fully compensate those whose earnings exceed the admissible
maximum. The reply to this complaint is that nothing prevents this group
from taking out additional insurance, the amount of which can be re-
vised upwards as income increases.
Another class of involuntary creditors are those who depend on some-
one else for their subsistence,"' such as spouses or relatives in the direct
line. "' They are protected against inflation by two mechanisms: judicial
revision and indexing. Alimony, whether paid periodically or as a lump
sum, ' 21 may be revised "whenever circumstances so justify."' The per-
son who seeks a revision must prove a change in the needs and means
116. Quebec Civil Code article 1056a provides: "No recourse provided for under the
provisions of this chapter shall lie, in the case of an accident contemplated by the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1931, except to the extent permitted by such act." Quebec Civil Code
article 1056d provides: "No recourse provided for under the provisions of this chapter shall
lie, in the case of an accident contemplated by the Automobile Insurance Act, except to
the extent permitted by such act."
117. QUE. REV. STAT. ch. A-25, § 27.
118. See An act to amend the Automobile Insurance Act and other legislation, G.O.Q.
pt. II, at 637, § 12 (English version 1983).
119. Barrbe, Influence de la ddprciation mondtaire sur les obligations alimentaires, in
INFLUENCE DE LA DEPRECIATION MON9TAIRE SUR LA VIE JURIDIQUE PRIVLE 35 (P. Durand ed.
1961).
120. Article 633 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides: "Spouses, and relatives in the
direct line, owe each other support."
121. Article 637 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides: "Support is payable as a pen-
sion; the court may, by way of exception, replace or complete the alimentary pension by
a fixed sum payable immediately or by instalments."
122. Article 642 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides: "The judgment awarding sup-
port, whether or not it is adjusted, may be reviewed whenever circumstances so justify."
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of the parties or in their circumstances.' Inflation may be a reason for
revision, provided that it has affected the situation of the creditor.' 4 The
creditor should not be forced to present himself before the court every
time he seeks to have a minor adjustment made due to inflation. For
this reason the new Civil Code of Quebec provides for the possibility of
automatic indexing of alimony.'25 Article 638 reads:
The court orders, on the motion of the creditor or, in the
absence of such a motion, ex officio, that support payable as a
pension be adjusted in accordance with the annual Pension Index
established pursuant to section 119 of the Act respecting the
Quebec Pension Plan (chapter R-9), unless the circumstances of
the parties justify the fixing of another index.
Indexing of alimony does not take place automatically; the court must
order it. This presupposes a hearing at which the parties may express their
point of view, after which the judge chooses the most appropriate solu-
tion.
CONCLUSION
Inflation raises, in lawyers' eyes, three fundamental questions: (1)
Should the law intervene in legal relationships because of injustice created
by inflation? (2) If so, which authority should intervene? (3) By what
criteria should this authority be guided?
The answer to these questions is not uniform throughout the civil
law; from one area to the next, different degrees of intervention may
be observed. It would be erroneous to conclude from this that lawyers
are clueless with regard to inflation. By examining the way in which in-
flation affects people, one readily discovers principles which allow clarity
to be brought into the apparent confusion of the law of inflation.
Inflation affects all obligations expressed in money by reducing their
value. The creditor of a monetary obligation does not necessarily suffer
damage as a result of inflation. To the extent that he has been able to
foresee inflation-by means of the interest rate of commercial banks, for
example-and to take it into account at the time when the obligation was
created, he receives the value he expected. In other words, those who
are parties to voluntary relationships do not need the law's protection
against foreseeable inflation: freedom of contract should be sufficient.
123. Article 635 of the Civil Code of Quebec provides: "In awarding support, account
is taken of the needs and means of the parties, their circumstances and, as the case may
be, the time needed by the creditor of support to acquire sufficient autonomy."
124. See Larivire, Droit de la Famille-l'obligation alimentaire, 8 R.J.T. 375 (1973).
125. See Gervais, L 'indexation des pensions alimentaires, 19 CAHIERS DE D. 781 (1978).
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The law limits itself, in their regard, to provisions of subsidiary law cor-
responding to what they would presumably choose themselves.
This principle is slightly mitigated to accommodate a group of people
who are deemed unable to take care of their own interests properly,
even though they are parties to voluntary relationships. These groups
are given special protection aimed at correcting their vulnerability in
contractual relationships. Since these rules are exceptions to the ordinary
principles of civil law, they have been created by the legislature rather
than the courts and they do not specifically address the problem of
inflation. The different focus of these rules creates difficulties for the
courts in applying them to inflation.
The law must find solutions for those who face unforeseeable infla-
tion and those who are parties to involuntary relationships. Where infla-
tion is truly unforeseeable, solutions must govern society as a whole.
Only the legislature has the powers required to solve the problem in
this case since such solutions require data to which, in the Quebec
judicial tradition, the courts do not generally have access.
Finally, there are the involuntary relationships. The creditor of the
monetary obligation in such a relationship cannot protect himself against
inflation, foreseeable or not, and to make him bear the burden of
inflation would, be unfair. Hence, public authority must come to the
rescue. Where inflation is unforeseeable, the legislature must protect
him. In cases of foreseeable inflation, the courts may assume this role
concurrently with the legislature.
The classification proposed here explains why the reasons to in-
tervene in private relationships as well as the intervening authority vary
from one area to another. Two of the three questions formulated above
are thus answered. The third question is more complex. The criteria
underlying the decisions of intervening authorities are not always ob-
vious; in some cases there appear to be none at all.
Where the legislature has stepped in to adjust pensions and other
monetary obligations, the correction has usually been less than the infla-
tion rate. Such a policy can be defended as an attempt to dissuade
citizens from being indifferent to inflation, where such indifference would
prolong and even stimulate inflation. Nonetheless, this policy may well
have modified the wealth distribution among groups in society. Be that
as it may, the great losers in the inflation game are those who live
on fixed revenues.
Elsewhere, the legislature has intervened to prevent certain groups
from taking advantage of differences between the market and the legal
system. The legal system should have the same flexibility as the market
in inflationary times. This principle also plays a role (but for the courts
this time) in the calculation of future loss of revenue as a result of
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personal injury. By choosing the proper discount rate, the courts must
prevent irresponsible individuals from destroying the physical integrity
of their fellow citizens at bargain prices. There is room here for an
explicit rule on the subject, which would put an end to the needless
repetition of economic evidence before courts of first instance. Such
a rule, be it judicial or legislative, should have the flexibility of market
discount rates.
A final guideline adopted by the courts is leaving the assessment
of damages to the last possible moment. The assessment takes place
not at the time when the damage was caused, but at the time of
the trial. The creditor, the party who has suffered the damage, is
thus shielded from inflation between the occurrence of the damage
and trial. This benefit is of some importance at high inflation rates
such as were experienced from 1980 through 1982. Thus, the courts
implicitly convert such claims into debts of value, a concept of German
origin for which several bases can be found in the Quebec Civil Code.
The difficulty inflation creates for the lawyer is that it complicates
his sense of equivalence: equivalence of performance in contract, which
is the basis of fair exchange, and equivalence of damages to the harm
that was done. The equivalence must be judged not only for the past,
but also for the future. Equivalence for the future is based on expecta-
tions, surely one of the most subjective and elusive concepts in the
law. Inflation thus forces the lawyer to refine his sense of justice by
recognizing equivalence, the principle of suum cuique tribuere, 26 in
new disguises.
126. "To render to everyone his own. One of the three fundamental maxims of the




CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, INFLATION RATE, AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
YEAR C.P.I.* INFLATION** RATE**
1971 100.0 2.9 6.2
1972 104.8 4.8 6.2
1973 112.7 7.5 5.5
1974 125.0 10.9 5.3
1975 138.5 10.8 6.9
1976 148.9 7.5 7.1
1977 160.8 8.0 8.1
1978 175.2 9.0 8.4
1979 191.2 9.1 7.5
1980 210.6 10.1 7.5
1981 236.9 12.5 7.6
1982 262.5 10.8 11.0
* STATISTICS CANADA, REVUE STATISTIQUE DU CANADA 11-003F, at
10, 47 (Jan. 1983); STATISTICS CANADA, L'INDICE DES PRIX A LA CONSOM-
MATION 62-001, at 9 (Dec. 1982).
** STATISTICS CANADA, REVUE STATISTIQUE DU CANADA 11-003F, at
11, 63 (Jan. 1983).
[Vol. 44
